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Following the attacks in Madrid in March 2004, 
Gijs de Vries has been appointed as Europe’s anti-
terrorism coordinator to foster information 
exchange among European security services. 
Gearing up security services is part of the EU 
security strategy put forward by EU High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy Javier Solana (2003), in which he also 
argues for a coherent EU foreign policy to create a 
ring of stable countries around the borders of the 
EU. 
Along the southern boundary of the EU this 
objective should be achieved through the 
Barcelona process, mainly consisting of bilateral 
trade agreements between the EU and countries at 
the southern periphery of the Mediterranean. In 
this policy brief we highlight the background of 
these agreements and we argue that they do not 
contribute to stability in this turbulent region. 
Implementing the current trade agreements 
between the EU and the Mediterranean countries 
will lead to increased unemployment and 
structural government deficits. With the current 
trade agreements the economic interests of 
agricultural producers in the southern EU member 
states prevail. 
An alternative strategy to liberalisation, which 
accounts for the economic development 
opportunities in the Mediterranean countries, 
offers better prospects for attaining stability at the 
southern borders of the EU. Such an alternative 
liberalisation scenario requires a balancing of 
regional economic interests with the long-term 
interests of the EU as a whole. 
 
Renewed Mediterranean relations 
The Barcelona process encompasses economic, 
political and social cooperation between the EU 
and countries south of the Mediterranean through 
Association Agreements. Despite a broad range of 
objectives, establishment of a Mediterranean free 
trade area by 2010 forms the focal point of the 
Association Agreements. An important feature of 
these trade agreements is the notion of reciprocity. 
This concept contrasts with earlier agreements 
from the 1970s, consisting of unilateral 
elimination of European barriers to Mediterranean 
industrial goods. 
Until now Association Agreements have been 
concluded with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and 
Tunisia. Negotiations with Syria are still ongoing. 
Together these countries will be referred to as the 
MED-9 in this policy brief. It should also be noted 
that in March 2004 Libya was invited by the 
European Commission to actively participate in 
the Barcelona process.  
Political versus economic interests 
The MED-9 countries are of little economic 
interest to the EU. Imports from the MED-9 
account for only 2% of EU imports, while exports 
to the MED-9 account for only 3% of total EU 
exports. Oil makes up the majority of EU imports 
from the MED-9, followed at a distance by 
agricultural products. Given the limited size of the 
agrarian trade flows, the European Commission 
does not consider the MED-9 a threat to EU 
farmers (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002).  
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The Association Agreements do serve a clear 
economic interest for the MED-9: 50% of their 
imports and exports are with the EU, which is 
their largest trade partner. The MED-9 countries 
have a comparative advantage in typical 
Mediterranean products such as fresh fruit, 
vegetables and olive oil. Improved access to 
European agricultural markets could provide a 
positive stimulus to their economies.  
Such a positive stimulus is badly needed. 
Economic growth in the MED-9 is lagging behind 
the growth rates in the rest of the world, while the 
MED-9 countries combine a young population 
with unemployment rates between 15 and 30%. 
Regional versus common interest 
The current trade agreements conflict with the 
interest of the EU in attaining stability at its 
southern borders, by having detailed schemes for 
abolishing protection on manufactured goods, but 
not so for agricultural products. From the 
perspective of stability at the southern periphery, 
and given the comparative advantages of the 
MED-9 in (labour-intensive) agriculture, the trade 
agreements should aim at relaxing the complex 
EU trade barriers for Mediterranean food 
products.  
Current EU concessions in this area are marginal, 
since MED-9 producers compete directly with 
producers from southern EU member states. 
Although concessions would have a marginal 
impact on the EU as a whole, relaxing restrictions 
on Mediterranean agricultural products would be 
noticeable in southern EU member states. The 
Association Agreements reflect these regional 
interests. 
The EU unilaterally removed its protection on 
manufactured goods in the 1970s. The Association 
Agreements are thus a de facto opening of the 
MED-9 countries for industrial imports from the 
EU. Since the MED-9 industrial producers are not 
internationally competitive, implementation of the 
trade agreements will decimate industry in the 
MED-9. The resulting reduction in already limited 
employment will not contribute to stability in the 
MED-9. Hence Tunisia, leading the region in 
terms of economic reforms, has postponed its 
reduction of industrial protection despite 
implementing far-reaching reforms in other parts 
of its economy.  
Next to a loss of employment in the industrial 
sector, implementation of the trade agreements 
will result in a decrease in tariff revenues. 
Government expenditures in the MED-9 are high 
owing to a bloated public sector: the share of non-
military public employment in total employment 
is twice the world average (Bulmer, 2000). In 
addition, producers of grain, meat and milk are 
subsidised to reduce dependence on imports, while 
the impact on consumers is limited through 
subsidies on staple foods. Reducing government 
revenues through trade liberalisation would thus 
have a direct impact on employment and 
consumer prices, with all its consequences in 
terms of social unrest. 
Domestic factors hampering growth 
European trade barriers are only one of the factors 
limiting economic growth in the MED-9. Next to a 
bloated public sector and market interventions, 
governments also play a direct role in MED-9 
economies through inefficient state enterprises, for 
example accounting for 30% of GDP in Egypt and 
Tunisia. Further, the MED-9 belongs to the most-
protected trade region in the world, which limits 
the competitiveness of the private sector. There is 
also an inflow of foreign exchange in the MED-9 
through oil revenues and remittances. This inflow 
of foreign exchange stimulates domestic demand 
for services and causes an appreciation of the 
exchange rate by increasing demand for imports, 
thus hampering exports. As a result, MED-9 
economies are oriented towards non-trade sectors. 
Trade protection distorts the structure of the 
economy and fosters an interest in maintaining 
such protection, which in turn hampers reform. An 
example is the industrial sector in the MED-9. 
Access to European markets has not led to a 
competitive sector, because continuing MED-9 
trade barriers have not provided an incentive to 
restructure industries. A comparable scenario 
would be possible with unconditional and 
unilateral reduction of European trade barriers for 
agricultural products. The complexity of the 
current protection implies that producers have 
invested in information and contacts to be able to 
export to the EU, and thus have an interest in 
maintaining the current protection structure. If the 
MED-9 countries retain their barriers to imports 
from the EU, there are no incentives for a 
restructuring of agricultural production.   
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Timely liberalisation 
Given the limited economic interest of the MED-9 
for the EU as a whole, there is room to support 
necessary reforms in the MED-9 through the 
careful sequencing of liberalisation. The timing of 
the liberalisation should aim at minimising social 
unrest, if only for the security interests of the EU. 
In general there are three factors to consider in 
determining the timing of liberalisation: 
employment, government budget and 
competitiveness. Because of the urgent need to 
increase employment it seems logical to start 
liberalising sectors that are labour-intensive and in 
which the MED-9 countries have a comparative 
advantage, i.e. agricultural products. Given the 
need to restructure MED-9 economies, this could 
be accompanied by a reduction in MED-9 barriers 
for internationally competitive industrial sectors 
that preferably use a lot of labour. 
The abolition of subsidies on atypical 
Mediterranean products such as grains, meat and 
milk would reduce government expenditures. This 
move would be necessary to deal with the reduced 
tariff revenues. Effects on consumers could be 
limited (and possibly positive) through cheaper 
imports from the EU. If employment can be 
maintained and possibly expanded, there would 
also be room to downsize the civil service. 
The timing of liberalisation can further play a role 
in limiting the damage to southern EU member 
states. With the eastward expansion of the EU, the 
market for (Mediterranean) agricultural products 
is expanding as well, limiting the impact of an 
increase in MED-9 competition on EU producers. 
Coherence is no guarantee 
Trade liberalisation stimulates economic growth 
and can be a powerful tool to increase prosperity 
and stability along the EU’s southern border. This 
first requires a coherent pursuit of long-term EU 
security interests instead of the short-term 
economic interests of southern EU member states. 
Second, liberalisation should be sequenced such 
that a reduction in trade protection is accompanied 
by the creation of new opportunities for sectors in 
which the MED-9 have a comparative advantage 
and that absorb a lot of labour. 
Such a coherent partnership between the EU and 
the MED-9 provides no guarantee that attacks 
such as those in Madrid will not occur again. 
Minimising the social impact of the urgently 
needed reforms in the MED-9 would, however, be 
a positive response to the recent attacks and 
provide the population in this turbulent region a 
chance of increased prosperity and stability in the 
long term.  
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